INTRODUCTION
Shareholder proposals in corporate America today come in all shapes and sizes.' Because the shareholder resolution process is fairly simple and inexpensive, it is an easy way for many large and small investors to have a voice in corporate governance. 2 The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or the "Commission") regulates the shareholder proposal process through the federal proxy rules. 3 These rules have been the subject of numerous amendments and changes in interpretation over time. 4 This Comment will focus on one of the ways in which a corporation can exclude a t B.S. 1996, Cornell University; J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor David Skeel, who continues to demonstrate his enthusiasm for teaching and genuine care about his students, for his invaluable comments and research advice; the Investor Responsibility Research Center, for providing the data that gave this Comment its foundation; the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their many efforts in putting this Comment in order and dedication throughout the year;, and most of all, my parents, Fran and Chuck Marino, for their love and support, and without whom none of this would be possible.
1 For instance, shareholders have asked IBM and Xerox to implement policies protecting Catholic workers in the companies' Northern Ireland facilities; shareholders have opposed Chevron's business in Marxist-controlled Angola; and white supremacist shareholders have even attempted to effect changes in AT&T policies. See Jolie Solomon, Social Activists Fighting Gag Rule; SEC Seeks Limits on Proxy Issues, BERGEN REC., May 17, 1992, at B-01 (discussing these and other issues that "social investors" have targeted).
2 The resolution process is embodied in Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, which generally provides that shareholders holding a minimum amount of stock in a corporation (determined either by dollar value or number of shares) may put forth and circulate certain types of proposals at the corporation's expense. The SEC recently ended another reexamination of the proxy rules. It is useful to look at these new amendments with a view toward predicting whether they will alter the analysis of executive compensation proposals under the ordinary business exclusion. It is also instructive to consider the role that the SEC has given itself, by proposing, but then not passing, a number of amendments. This Comment will argue that the enacted amendments will have virtually no effect on the analysis of executive compensation under today's Rule 14a-8(i)(7). Furthermore, the emphasis that compensation critics place on altering the proxy rules as a means of correcting compensation abuses is misplaced.
Underlying this entire analysis is the assumption that excessive levels of executive compensation are a problem, and that they do, in fact, hurt someone. 12 In some respects, this discussion is simply a restatement of the shareholder passivity arguments originating from the work of Berle and Means 13 and developed more fully earlier in this decade.1 4 This Comment goes further, however, and argues that shareholders are not passive in general; rather, there must be something in the fundamental nature of executive compensation proposals that affects their treatment in ways that other proposals are not so affected.
Part I explores executive pay issues and trends throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Part II. discusses the history of shareholder proposals dealing with executive compensation issues under Rule 14a-8(i)(7) since its adoption in 1954. This Part focuses mainly on the changes in the proxy rules and their interpretation since 1992 and the recently passed amendments to Rule 14a-8. Part III examines statistics compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center ("IRRC") concerning the type and number of compensation-related proposals submitted by shareholders. This Part also outlines 12 This assumption is itself the focus of some scholarly debate. Compare, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 9 passim (arguing from a variety of perspectives that executive compensation is excessive), and Yablon, supra note 9, at 1874 (concluding that "there is strong evidence that the current compensation of American CEOs is high by both recent historical and international standards"), with Carl T. Bogus (MacMillan 1932) (determining that as corporations grow and shareholders become more scattered, division between ownership and control of the corporation is inevitable).
14 The essence of the story is that shareholders are simply passive, and efforts to remove legal barriers through proxy reforms are useless. This tale was woven with great detail by Professor Black. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 522 (1990).
The decade also saw the emergence of "compensation consultants"2 ' and "compensation committees,"2 ' both well-intentioned efforts at sanitizing the executive pay-setting process. In most large corporations, the final determination concerning compensation comes from a confluence of these two bodies-the compensation consultants "guide" the independent committee in making its decision. 24 
B. The Early '90s: What Recession?
In the early 1990s, the media and the recession combined to focus public attention on executive salaries. 25 The continued rise in executive compensation would not have been so problematic if company profits also had increased, or workers' earnings had risen commensurately, but studies indicated that this was not so. 2 6 Compensation simply did not correlate with company performance: "CEOs enjoyed an average pay increase of 9.4% in 1991 even though their companies' profits declined 7% and the median price of their companies' stock fell 7.7%." 2 Thus, stock options, a means 22 Id. at 1877-81 (noting that although the ideal role of the compensation consultant is to advise the corporation about executive compensation, the actual role is to justify pay raises for the CEO). Graef Crystal, who was a compensation consultant for 20 years before switching sides and focusing his concerns on the excessiveness of executive compensation, claims to have overheard the following conversation between two directors:
Director POST, Mar. 17, 1992 , at A17 (recognizing that excesses in compensation persist despite the fact that compensation committees have been in place for some time in many large corporations). 24 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1877-89 (discussing the emergence of compensation consultants, and their influence on the board's compensation committee decision). 25 See Longstreth, supra note 23 (recognizing the influence of these two events). " [l] n an atmosphere suffused with recession fears and election-year nonsense, the natural attractions of the subject are magnified." Id. 26 See Robert J. McCartney, Executive Pay Rises, as Profits Fall, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1992, at C1 ("The average compensation of chief executives of America's largest companies rose faster than the average earnings of workers last year, while profits of the companies they headed fell sharply...."). 27 Bogus, supra note 12, at 7 (footnotes omitted).
UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAgWREVIEW [Vol. 147:1205 of tying pay to performance, continued as a popular source of CEO income in the early part of the decade.
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Despite the heightened attention given to the issue, 141 companies paid each of their CEOs a salary of over $1 million in 1991. 30 One survey indicated that the median annual compensation package given to CEOs of 200 of the largest U.S. companies during 1991 was $2.4 million. 31 A similar picture was presented during the next few years. According to a Forbes study, the average pay of CEOs at the fifty largest U.S. corporations was $3.5 million in 1992,32 while The Wall Street Journal reported the median income of all CEOs to be an estimated $1.5 million for that year. 33 Finally, a 1993 survey conducted by Fortune indicated that the CEOs of 200 U.S. corporations averaged salaries of $4.1 million. 34 Although the country was in a recession, it is clear that this factor was not noticed in compensation committee discussions or in the boardroom.
A number of things should be made clear in looking at these figures ($2.4 million in 1991; $3.5 million in 1992; $4.1 million in 1993). First, these figures are highly dependent on the calculation techniques used by each surveyor. Some surveys include a weighted value for stock options, even if these options are not exercised, while others fail to consider them if 28 See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing the pay-for-performance approach, which links executive conipensation to company profits). they remain unexercised for the year. 35 Second, some of these figures are focusing on a particular class of CEOs (for example, "the Super 50"36), while others purport to be reporting the mean or median for all CEOs. Third, and most important for purposes of this discussion, these figures are astonishingly large in absolute terms, regardless of the survey technique used or the class sampled. 37 Compensation committees also started to come under attack in the early part of the decade? 8 Salient questions have been raised about the actual independence of these committees, which attempt to remove the self-interest inherent in the pay-setting process and are usually the final arbiter of an executive's pay. 39 So-called "negotiations" between a CEO and the outside directors who determine her pay are hardly negotiations at all. Compensation committees advised by pay consultants usually set the CEO's salary. 40 Companies, in turn, "usually tell the adviser that they want to set pay levels at a certain industry percentile-often 75% or more."' 1 Forging mutually beneficial relationships with the directors that make up the compensation committee apparently does not hurt either--Congress has received testimony to the effect that there is a strong relationship between a CEO's compensation and the compensation of the board members on the compensation 35 See Crystal, supra note 7, at 94 (explaining that Fortune magazine's annual survey includes a weighted value for stock options because some "CEOs don't realize option gains until after retirement so the gains are never reported").
36 This is Forbes's designation. See Wong, supra note 32, at 105 (referring to the top 50 "Forbes 500 companies with the best composite ranking ordered by sales, profits, assets and market value"). 37 See, e.g., Douglas C. committee that determines the CEO's pay. Given these factors, it is generally acknowledged that a CEO can name her price.
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Why the connection between director pay and CEO pay? This is an area laden with conflicts of interest-these conflicts likely result in directors acting in their own, rather than the shareholders', best interests. A clear manifestation of this conflict is evident when analyzing the directors themselves. Most directors are top executives at other corporations, logically suggesting that they would have a reciprocal interest in promoting healthy executive pay levels. 44 Two executives sitting on each other's compensation committees presents an even more egregious example of a conflict of interest.
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C. Compensation Trends Today
Executive compensation actually continued to increase after the SEC passed the enhanced disclosure rules in 1992.46 Yet the disclosure rules were aimed at facilitating shareholder awareness of compensation abuses. 47 And with increased awareness and the newly granted ability to put forward a shareholder proposal addressing executive compensation, 48 shareholders were thought to hold the key to curbing managerial excess. 49 The truth of the matter, however, is that "the compensation of most CEOs rises each year, as predictably as the sun comes up every day, even if their performance hurts a company's returns and imperils its future." 50 In short, there are no signs of a slow-down in pay increases. A perennial problem for shareholders and commentators has been the perceived lack of incentives for CEOs to perform well. 51 This has led to compensation reform suggestions which aim to tie pay to performance. The "pay-for-performance mentality" 52 has often been linked to the rise in institutional shareholder activism since this is viewed as a relatively benign request to management and therefore one that institutional investors might be willing to make. The idea behind these plans is to expose executives to some of the risks that the shareholders of a corporation bear.
5 3 Large salaries do not create an efficient incentive scheme for managers because they are often paid the same amount irrespective of corporate performance.
4
Shareholders need a justification for the sheer amounts of money being doled out to executives. Fairness requires an increase in pay for a job well 49 See Terrion, supra note 47, at 1197 (predicting that the new disclosure system and the reinterpretation of the ordinary business rule "will give shareholders the power to have input in the management of the corporations which they own"). 916-17 (1992) (describing the "ratcheting effect" which produces higher and higher levels of executive pay); Yablon, supra note 9, at 1877 (noting that the "ratcheting effect" generates continuously higher levels of compensation regardless of performance). done; fairness also suggests a cutback in cases of poor performance. 55 Instead, a study done in 1991 by compensation expert Graef Crystal indicated that a 20% decline in company profits still, on average, resulted in a 7.6% increase in pay, while a 30% profit decline resulted in a 6.1% increase in pay. 5 6 Evidence indicates that institutional investors may be amenable to linking an executive's pay to her performance. 5 7 Research in recent years demonstrates that pay-for-performance proposals receive "on average the most support of any type of resolution to restrict executive compensation."" Institutional investors, however, face a number of barriers to activism that may work to limit their ability to constrain management, even with respect to relatively benign shareholder proposals such as those concerning pay-forperformance. 59 There are indications that changes are on the horizon as corporate America enters the new millenium. The situation at Bear Steams, a leading investment banking firm, is illustrative of some of the most recent changes. Although the top five executives at Bear Steams were paid a combined $87 million in fiscal year 1997, that compensation was tied completely to the performance of the company. 6 0 The top five executives all have base salaries of $200,000-the remainder of their salaries were derived from the firm's profits, which jumped 25% during the year. 61 Bear Steams, like many other companies, also stopped doling out stock options a number of 55 See Crystal, supra note 7, at 95 ("[P]aying more for better performance is simply fair and just-as long as the company also lowers pay for poor performance."). The obvious managerial response to such an assertion is that the poor performance of a corporation is often not a reflection of the executive's work, but rather a convergence of various market responses, and the CEO should not be penalized for those forces over which she has no control. 
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See infra notes 170-84 and accompanying text (discussing a variety of factors that may account for the lack of institutional investor activism in this area, such as agency costs associated with activism, preferences for liquidity, collective action problems, a lack of positive incentives, and conflicts of interest). years ago. 62 The formula used at Bear Steams-a low base salary with additional compensation tied to performance-provides evidence that incentive-based compensation can work and has likely earned Bear Steams kudos from its shareholders.
A number of additional trends have emerged in the last few years. First, along with the rise in incentive-based compensation, there also has been a virtual disappearance of option repricing. 63 Repricing has been dramatically affected by both "investor furor and the [SEC's] new proxystatement rules for executive pay."6 Options were originally introduced into pay packages as a form of incentive-based compensation. If company stock did well, executives holding options would exercise them and reap the benefits. Conversely, if the company did poorly and stock value dropped below the exercise price of the option, the option would be worthless. With the introduction of repricing, companies were effectively able to take the "incentive" out, because the options no longer had a downside. 6 1 The IRRC reported that fewer than five percent of the 1500 companies it studied repriced options in 1996.66 Another relatively new development is the increase in shareholder proposals that try to link executive compensation with social performance. 67 Companies in the 1990s have touted their ability to be socially responsible, and shareholders have used resolutions as vehicles for encouraging companies to tie executive pay to the company's social performance.
8 According to the IRRC, proposals linking social issues to executive pay were the most 62 See id. (indicating that this practice stopped in 1989). Note, however, that the overall "trend toward paying executives in stock options has accelerated since a 1993 law capped the amount of salary compensation a corporation can deduct from its taxes." Clark, supra note 37, at A29. 63 Option repricing occurs when the stock's price falls below the option's exercise price, and the board of directors lowers the option's exercise price to account for the decrease in share value. See Lublin, supra note 46, at RI. This gives companies the ability to turn "underwater options" (that is, options that would not be exercised and hence have no value to the holder) back into "in-the-money" options. cause his compensation package is intricately tied to the company's stock performance.
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Binding shareholder resolutions were introduced for the first time in 199777 and were tested at a few companies during the year. 7 8 Fleming Companies Inc. is noteworthy in this area because its shareholders barred management from reviving a poison pill without shareholder approval. 79 Poison pills are used to deter unwanted takeovers by giving shareholders the right to buy more shares at a discounted price, thus making a takeover much less attractive for the acquirer. 80 Fleming's shareholders only attempted the binding resolution after a nonbinding resolution to remove the pill in 1996, which garnered the support of sixty-four percent of the voting shares, was ignored by management.81 Fleming decided to take down the pill voluntarily after a federal court upheld the validity of the binding resolution. 82 The In another important decision concerning Fleming, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently upheld the right of that company's shareholders to put forth and pursue a mandatory bylaw.8 4 This is "the first time that a state supreme court has upheld stockholders' rights to bring a binding bylaw proposal," 85 and casts doubt on whether the SEC will continue to require that shareholder proposals be precatory in order to pass muster.
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II. HISTORY OF THE "ORDINARY BUSINESS" EXCLUSION AS IT APPLIES TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. Early History
Congress's original intent in adopting the federal proxy rules was to "institutionalize the ideal of corporate democracy" 87 and to provide an assurance of "fair, and effective shareholder suffrage.,, 88 Rule 14a-8 is generally known as the shareholder proposal rule, and it enables certain shareholders to put forth proper proposals in a corporation's proxy materials at the expense of the corporation. The exceptions to the rule, which are now listed in Rule 14a-8(i), limit a shareholder's ability to make certain types of proposals. The registrant may omit a proposal and any statement in support thereof from its proxy statement and form of proxy under any of the following circumstances:
(1) If the proposal is, under the laws of the registrant's domicile, not a proper subject for action by security holders. The ordinary business exclusion was added to section 14 in 1954.90 It operates to exclude proposals from the proxy materials that are deemed to deal with the ordinary business of the corporation. 91 The authority to exclude these types of proposals comes from the directors' powers over the general affairs of the corporation. 92 Since the addition of Rule 14a-8(i)(7) to the proxy rules, the SEC's policy had been to send no-action letters 93 to the proponent or to further a personal interest, which benefit or interest is not shared with the other security holders at large; (5)
If the proposal relates to operations which account for less than 5 percent of the registrant's total assets at the end of its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for its most recent fiscal year, and is not otherwise significantly related to the registrant's business; (6) If the proposal deals with a matter beyond the registrant's power to effectuate; (7)
If the proposal deals with a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the registrant; (8)
If the proposal relates to an election to office;
If the proposal is counter to a proposal to be submitted by the registrant at the meeting; (10) If the proposal has been rendered moot;
If the proposal is substantially duplicative of a proposal previously submitted to the registrant by another proponent, which proposal will be included in the registrant's proxy material for the meeting; (12) If the proposal deals with substantially the same subject matter as a prior proposal submitted to security holders in the registrant's proxy statement...within the preceding five calendar years, it may be omitted... Provided, That-(i) If the proposal was submitted at only one meeting during such preceding period, it received less than three percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or (ii) If the proposal was submitted at only two meetings during such preceding period, it received at the time of its second submission less than six percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or (iii) If the prior proposal was submitted at three or more meetings during such preceding period, it received at the time of its latest submission less than 10 percent of the total number of votes cast in regard thereto; or (13) If the proposal relates to specific amounts of cash or stock dividends. ., be permitted to omit... a proposal which is a recommendation or request with respect to the conduct of the ordinary business operations of the issuer."). As mentioned previously, the exclusion was originally codified as Rule 14a-8(c)(5), was later changed to (c)(7), and was most recently changed to (i)(7 companies that desired to exclude any proposals dealing with compensation from the proxy materials. 94 The dominant view at that time, and still among some today, is that compensation issues should be left to the discretion of management.
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Over time, the Commission began to allow certain proposals that dealt with specific types of executive compensation to be included in the proxy materials. 96 Still, the general exclusion on executive compensation proposals persisted. Further, even if a shareholder could sidestep these subjectmatter limitations, she would still have to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 14a-8 in order for her proposal to be includable.
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B. 1992 SEC Switch
As public opinion about the excessiveness of executive compensation became more pronounced, SEC views shifted on the issue of whether shareholder proposals in this area should be excludable from the proxy materials. 9 8 In early 1992, the SEC sent out ten no-action letters on the same day, all refusing to allow the exclusion of proposals relating to executive compensation. 99 Of course, the proposals still needed to address only "executive" compensation and also had to be phrased in precatory terms in order to pass muster. 10 0 Then-Chairman Breeden explained the SEC's change in policy: "[T]he level of public and shareholder concern over the issue of senior executive compensation has become intense and widespread.'' Other commentators focused on the potential for self-dealing that is inherent in the existing pay-setting scenario as a justification for including these pro-
Recognizing that shareholders cannot attack compensation abuse if they do not understand it, the SEC also amended the proxy rules in 1992 to provide for easier communication among shareholders and enhanced disclosure of executive compensation. The idea behind these revisions was that they would give shareholders more information and enable them to participate at greater levels, thereby providing motivation for corporations to monitor executive compensation decisions on their own. 106 There were only a few compensation-related proposals in 1992, however, perhaps due to the fact that the SEC's policy reversal came after the proposal filing deadlines for most companies. 
C. The Current Status of Executive Compensation Under Rule 14a-8(i) (7) and the Impact of the Latest Series of SEC Amendments
The ideology accompanying the 1992 switch remains today, despite the urgings of various critics who have indicated that the reform process must continue.1 8 Some scholars urge reforms with respect to specific policies: (1) the SEC's policy still does not directly give shareholders the right to vote on an executive's pay package since any proposal put forth and voted on is still only advisory and proposals need to be couched in precatory terms that merely request board action;1 0 9 and (2) the SEC policy continues to offer only a narrow window for shareholders-their proposals can only relate to "senior executive compensation" not "general compensation policy."
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Regardless of whether these changes ever occur, the changes that already have been made do not adequately address the lurking problem of executive overcompensation.
made ... both with respect to present inducements to join the registrant's top management and future promises...."). 109 See Palmiter, supra note 4, at 890-91 ("Among the agency's most established assumptions is that state law permits only precatory shareholder resolutions that request, but do not demand, board action."); Simpson, supra note 96, at 212 ("Under the SEC's new policy, any shareholder proposal is merely advisory in nature."); see also supra notes 77, 100 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that proposals be advisory).
Simpson, supra note 96, at 212. It is easy to see how a narrow definition of "senior" makes it impossible to attack the salaries of many highly paid executives through shareholder proposals.
Impact of the Latest Series of Amendments
The reform process has continued in the form of new amendments to the federal proxy rules, which followed an extensive study and survey of the issues conducted by the SEC."' 1 The response to the proposed SEC amendments was mixed-some thought that they would be an improvement in certain areas, 112 while others believed that they would be severely detrimental to shareholder rights. t 1 3 Some of the proposed amendments were passed by the SEC "with modifications" in 1998, and were effective by the start of the 1999 proxy season. Of those corporations that answered Question 46d (which asked whether proposals relating to executive/director compensation should always be included, regardless of a numerical limit on proposals), only 14 survey respondents provided an affirmative response (4.2%). Question 54a (which asked whether executive/director compensation proposals should always be included if the existing shareholder proposal rule is retained) received 46 affirmative replies (13.9%). although helpful to larger investors, was not viewed by small shareholders as outweighing the negative impacts of the increased resubmission thresholds and holding requirements. However, the only amendments mentioned in the preceding paragraph that were actually passed were the ones increasing the dollar value of a company's shares that a shareholder must own in order to submit a proposal n 1 and reversing SEC policy concerning the Cracker Barrel decision. 119 None of the more controversial reforms were passed by the SEC, "due in part to strong concerns expressed by commenters. 
. ").
116 This result would have been accomplished primarily in two ways. First, it was proposed that Rule 14a-8(i)(12), which states the percentage thresholds for resubmission of a proposal, be amended to reflect higher percentages (to 6% on the first submission, 15% on the second submission, and 30% on the third-an increase from the pre-amendment levels of 3%, 6%, and 10%, respectively standing the rule. 121 Thus, these reforms arguably will have little or no substantive effect on shareholder proposals in general and no effect on shareholder proposals concerning executive compensation.
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The SEC was quite comical in its treatment of the proxy rule situation, given that it was rejecting virtually all of the reforms that could potentially have had any substantive impact on the shareholder proposal process:
Some of the proposals we are not adopting share a common theme: to reduce the Commission's and its staff's role in the process and to provide shareholders and companies with a greater opportunity to decide for themselves which proposals are sufficiently important and relevant to the company's business to justify inclusion in its proxy materials. However, a number of commenters resisted the idea of significantly decreasing the role of the Commission and its staff as informal arbiters .... [C]ommenters were equally unsupportive of fundamental alternatives to the existing rule and process that, in different degrees, would have decreased the Commission's overall participation.
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Thus, despite the SEC's valiant efforts to remove itself from its firmly entrenched position as ringmaster between the competing interests of shareholders and firms, the amended rules "will continue to require [the SEC] to make difficult judgments about interpretations of proposals, the motives of those submitting them, and the policies to which they relate."' 1 2 4 With its customary naivet6, the SEC announced that the one major change it did make to the rule (question and answer format) may result in more shareholder proposals being submitted each year. 
III. WERE SHAREHOLDERS UP TO THE CHALLENGE?
A
. An Examination of Shareholder Proposals Submitted from 1994 to the Present
To Rise or Fall?
Many journalists and commentators predicted that there would be a significant increase in shareholder proposals as a result of the changes in 1992 concerning enhanced disclosure and the interpretation of the proxy rules as they relate to executive compensation.
1 33 The number of shareholder proposals dealing with corporate governance issues have increased each year since 1992. Overall, the total number of shareholder proposals offered also have increased generally since 1992. These figures are clear from the following However, when narrowing the class of corporate governance proposals to those strictly dealing with executive compensation, a very different picture emerges. Against a backdrop of serious discussion among practitioners, academics, journalists, and the SEC to increase shareholder access to the proxy, statistics reveal that shareholder proposals concerning executive compensation have actually dropped in recent years, 135 and institutional investors have played a weak role overall. 133 See, e.g., Bachelder, supra note 96, at 3 ("A consequence of this SEC change probably will be a dramatic increase in the number of shareholder proposals for inclusion in proxy statements."). 134 Facsimile from Drew Hambly, Research Analyst, Investor Responsibility Research Center, to Lori Marino I (Feb. 3, 1999) (on file with author).
See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at I (noting a decline in proposals in 1996, the third consecutive year that there was a drop in resolutions that came to a vote).
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The IRRC has a "universe" 136 of corporations that it tracks for shareholder proposals. Following is another tabulation of information compiled by the IRRC specifically related to executive compensation: 37 This data presents an interesting picture of the state of executive compensation-related proposals. First, the average support level for proposals in this area remains pitifully low. Resolution proponents seem unable to muster significant shareholder support, regardless of what type of executive compensation resolution is proposed.
3 8 Next, looking at the total number of proposals submitted, an odd picture emerges. Taking the data back one more year, 139 research compiled by the IRRC demonstrated a decline in the number of executive compensation proposals for the years 1994 to 1996. The high 1997 figure appears to be the anomaly, largely due to the efforts of a single shareholder who put forth twenty-one of the resolutions on his own. 140 The return to a much lower number of proposals submitted (72) in 136 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 2 (describing the different groups that make up the research universe). The data for 1997 were drawn from a universe called the "Super 1500," while the data for 1996 were drawn from a somewhat different composition of 1998 strengthens this hypothesis. Overall then, it seems fairly conservative to state that over the last four years, the number of proposals submitted has stayed relatively flat and at a very low level, while the average support for these proposals has also remained low. For a variety of reasons, the total number of proposals that are actually brought to a vote at any company is always markedly different from the number submitted.
141 Again, the 1997 proxy season was the anomaly, with a slightly higher number of proposals that actually came to a vote. Otherwise the figure has remained pretty consistent over the past four yearsconsistently low. What happened to the astonishing sixty-nine proposals that were brought in 1997 but never came to a vote? Thirty-three of them did not withstand SEC scrutiny and were omitted by the company from the proxy statement, four were not revised in accordance with SEC requirements, fourteen were withdrawn, nine were not presented, eight did not appear in the proxy materials, and one was postponed.
Based on these numbers, it is clear that companies are not afraid to take their case for omission to the SEC.
How much, however, can we really read into the numbers? For the sake of the argument put forth in this Comment, it does not take too much reading. Once one accepts the figures presented at the start of this Section in Table 1 , indicating that in recent years shareholders in general have been more active in bringing proposals, invoking the shareholder passivity argument with respect to executive compensation proposals loses some force.
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Shareholders are not passive in general, but they are passive when it comes to these types of proposals. This simply alerts us to the possibility that there may be something in the nature of executive compensation proposals that makes them an unattractive topic for activism. In the next Section, I will make the case that it is only the individual shareholder that has been willing to take up the cause of the compensation critics. In the next Subpart, I will ments). Were it not for his 21 proposals, the 1997 figure would have been 95. Note that Paul Sheehan did not bring any resolutions in the 1998 proxy season. See 1999 Shareholder Report, supra note 137, at I (noting Sheehan's failure to revive his resolutions). 141 The differences between columns two and three of Table 2 are due to the fact that some proposals are withdrawn, some are not revised in accordance with SEC requirements, some are not presented at the annual shareholder meeting, and some are omitted by the company. See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 2; 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 3.
142 See 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 7-10 (presenting these figures). Note that the analogous figures for 1996 were all much lower. See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 2. In that year, the SEC issued no-action letters on 12 resolutions, an additional six were not revised according to SEC recommendations, "one did not appear in the proxy materials, four were withdrawn, and one was not presented." Id. 143 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the shareholder passivity argument).
address why institutional investors are unwilling, or unable, to make inroads in this area. The underlying message here is one for the compensation critics: although increasing shareholder access to the proxy has promise in certain areas of shareholder activism, it has proved futile in the area of executive compensation, and therefore seeking relief by way of the proxy rules is misguided.
Which Shareholders Are Waging the Battle?
Interestingly, it has been individual shareholders who have largely fought the battle on executive pay through shareholder proposals.
1 4 Individuals sponsored all but eight of the executive compensation proposals in 1996;145 individuals were responsible for nearly three-quarters of the resolutions in 1997; 146 and individuals again put forth a majority of the proposals in 1998.147 Unless institutional investors are finding behind-the-scenes methods of influencing this issue, the figures seem to indicate that the rise of the institutional investor has not been the panacea that some suggested it would be. 4 In fact, a 1996 IRRC survey of voting by institutional investors revealed that " [o] verall, the percentage of surveyed respondents with blanket policies of voting against such resolutions outnumber[s] that of respondents with blanket policies in favor of them."
149 Not only are institutional investors not bringing these proposals, but growing numbers of institutional investors are, in effect, hindering shareholders who do bring such proposals by instituting blanket policies of voting down these proposals.
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The exception to this trend concems proposals that tie pay to performance. These proposals had increasing support from institutional investors from 1994 to 1996.15 Not only are individual investors submitting the most proposals, but they are also quite persistent in their desire to effect changes in this area of corporate governance. A number of the shareholder proponents in 1997 were repeat players-they offered the same resolutions at a number of different companies in which they owned stock.
15 2 Furthermore, a number of 153 the proponents in 1997 had submitted similar proposals in 1996. Both of these trends (submissions at multiple companies and in multiple years) continued in the 1997 proxy season. 54 With these factors in mind, it is clear that the proposed increase in the resubmission thresholds would have had a dramatic effect on the number of proposals that could be brought in the area of executive compensation.
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The average percentage of shareholder support across all types of proposals on executive compensation has hovered around ten percent over the last four proxy seasons. 56 Because the proposed amendment would have increased the resubmission thresholds, many of the repeat proposals would have been excludable at the second resubmission level (fifteen percent). Without institutional investor support, an individual shareholder would have had an extremely difficult time satisfying the heightened resubmission thresholds. Of course, the SEC chose not to further restrict access to the proxy in this way and rejected the proposed amendments, leaving this area substantively unchanged. 152 See 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 7-8 (noting that E. George submitted proposals at nine companies; E. Davis submitted proposals at eight companies; A. Gavitt submitted proposals at five companies; and P. Sheehan filed resolutions with 22 companies). 153 See id. at 4-8 (displaying the 1996 and 1997 charts, which reveal the shareholder overlap).
15 Compare 1998 Shareholder Report, supra note 63, at 7-10, with 1997 Shareholder Report, supra note 52, at 4-6.
155 Currently, in order to resubmit a proposal that has been voted on in a prior year, one must satisfy the "resubmission thresholds.' See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing the current resubmission thresholds and the proposed amendment which would have raised those threshold levels). 156 See supra Table 2 (indicating 1995, 1996 , 1997 and 1998 figures of 11.8%, 11.10/, 10.4%, and 8.6%, respectively). 157 See supra note 116 and text accompanying note 118 (discussing the proposed amendment to the resubmission thresholds and the fact that the amendment was never passed). [Vol. 147:1205
B. Institutional Investors as the Faux Panacea
The 1990s marked the first time that institutional investors 158 "controlled more than half the shares in American corporations." 1 5 9 Such large shareholdings make it difficult for these investors to follow the traditional "Wall Street Rule." 160 This results from the theory that large blocks of shares are relatively illiquid because an attempt to sell the block would send a signal to the market, resulting in a drop in share price. 161 increasing the size of shareholding partially helps to solve the collective action problem that has always faced shareholders.
165
Do institutional investors really have the incentives to constrain management? A number of factors conspire against the promise of institutional investor activism, leading one author to state "that the new academic vision of institutional investors liberating corporate governance and emancipating shareholders from the tyranny of self-perpetuating corporate managers is... a mirage."' 66 With respect to executive compensation issues, it seems that this view has, in fact, carried the day.
Although institutional investors have displayed activism in other, less controversial areas, 167 they have not shown a concerted effort to tackle the issue of executive compensation. To the contrary, with the exception of proposals trying to link pay to performance, institutional investors have recently demonstrated their lack of support by instituting blanket policies to vote down shareholder proposals-specifically those dealing with executive pay. 168 Furthermore, proposals concerning executive pay declined from the 1994 to 1996 proxy seasons, and despite a surge in 1997, dropped back down in 1998.169 Why the outright aversion to activism in this area?
One reason is the likelihood that institutional investors do not want to become embroiled in such controversial issues with management, and, when embroiled, would rather fight their battles behind the scenes than during shareholder meetings.
17 There were also a number of more forceful argu- 165 See Rock, supra note 158, at 452 (noting that institutional shareholder activism is made possible partly due to the gains realized through a reduction in the collective action problem). (wondering "whether institutions possess the necessary expertise to monitor effectively, even if they are willing to monitor" (citation omitted)). Professor Rock, in his seminal article in this field, also predicted that despite potential gains in certain areas, an overall increase in institutional, shareholder activism was unlikely. See Rock, supra note 158, at 453 ("Mhe optimists' vision of the institutional investor as the shareholders' champion... will prove illusory."). 167 See Rock, supra note 158, at 481-84 & nn.134-53 (discussing institutional investor support of shareholder proposals in a variety of contexts); id. at 451 (giving an example of a proposal which has received support); see also id. at 449 (noting generally that "shareholder proposals, particularly proposals by institutional shareholders, have received substantial shareholder support" in the five-year period between 1985 and 1990) . 168 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (noting the blanket voting rules adopted by institutional investors). 169 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the three-year decline in proposals).
No See Tobin, supra note 17, at 1729 (indicating that "institutional investors are focusing their activism on corporate performance, primarily through pressure on boards"). Although the other factors are not irrelevant to this analysis, it is the variety of conflicts of interest that likely accounts for the institutional investors' inability to remedy (or even address) the problem of executive compensation. If any conflicts of interest truly do exist between institutional investors and the corporations in which they own equity, there is a strong argument that this is precisely where one would expect to see them.
A few examples aptly demonstrate how these conflicts of interest destroy any ability that institutional investors may have to effect changes in executive compensation through shareholder proposals. First, it is recognized that "opposing management in proxy issues can damage the relationships between institutional investors and management."
176 Also, banks and insurance companies have historically been the least willing types of institutional investor to oppose management due to a fear of retaliation. 1 77 Because many banks and insurance companies also have business relationships with the companies that they invest in, they are justifiably wary of upsetting those relationships. Money managers are also in constant competition for new accounts and may not be able to overcome a reputation of being "active" managers, especially ones who support limits on executive compensation. 178 Finally, in a world where passive investment strategies 179 dominate institutional shareholders are the most active source of current pressure on directors to shift focus to issues of general corporate performance." Id at 1730. 171 See, e.g., Rock, supra note 158, at 464-78 (providing an in-depth analysis of the agencY costs associated with institutional shareholder activism). 2 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 161, at 1318-21 (describing how some institutions' need for liquidity may quell activism). 173 See, e.g., id. at 1280 n.8 (suggesting that collective action problems "deserve.., weight in any theory of institutional investor behavior"). 174 See, e.g., Rock, supra note 158, at 472 (asking "whether money managers have sufficient 1 uositive incentives to act in shareholders' interest").
5 See Black, supra note 14, at 524 (recognizing that conflicts of interest play a significant role for companies); Coffee, supra note 161, at 1321-22 (noting a variety of ways in which institutional investors face conflicts of interest); Rock, supra note 158, at 469-72 (same).
176 Rock, supra note 158, at 471 n.83. 177 See Coffee, supra note 161, at 1321 (noting the "fear that their firn will lose business ... if the investor is perceived as an 'activist').
178 See id. at 1322 (recognizing the fear of reputational damage). 179 For simplicity, the definition of a passive strategy is "one that invests only in index funds and weights those funds in fixed proportions that do not change in response to market conditions." BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 567. This finance textbook gives as its standard many large funds, "the principal way to improve performance is to cut costs.' ' 1 8 Any activism by the fund manager will only increase costs and thereby reduce returns to investors. These four simple conflicts make clear why it is probably not in an institutional investor's best interests to attack management on the executive compensation front. In addition to conflicts of interest, there is one further reason why institutional shareholders logically would be hesitant to try to correct compensation abuses. Executive compensation makes up such a small percentage of a firm's assets that even excessive pay packages likely will not cause a blip in a firm's stock value. 13 1 As one scholar noted, "Acceding to excessive compensation is one way to keep on managers' good side without hurting the value of the shareholders' stock portfolio.' 82 Professor Skeel perceptively contrasts the issue of executive compensation with that of takeovers, where "institutional shareholders cannot afford to cater to managers' desire for protection because the effect on stock price is so great."' 8 3
This salient justification for a lack of concern (that is, that there is no effect on stock value), coupled with serious conflicts of interest that actually weigh against activism, could account for the lack of serious attention paid to this issue by institutional investors. In sum, although institutional investors clearly have the capability to induce change in this area, their reluctance has left the onus on individual shareholders, who continue to be the most active in putting forth proposals.18 4
C. Arguments Against Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy
Most writing throughout the last two decades has focused on increasing shareholder access to the proxy.1 8 5 As an argument in favor of generally inpassive strategy one that always puts 60% of its funds in a stock market index fund, 30% in a bond index fund, and 10% in a money market fund. See id 180 Rock, supra note 158, at 474. 181 See Yablon, supra note 9, at 1875 (noting the insignificance of CEO compensation to corporate treasuries); see also E-mail from David Skeel, Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Lori Marino (Feb. 18, 1999) (on file with author). 183 E-mail from David Skeel, supra note 181.
Id.
184 See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (recognizing that individual shareholders have put forth the vast majority of proposals). 185 Each of the following authors has put forward an argument for increasing shareholder access to the proxy. See Fisch, supra note 9, at 1139 (arguing that "the SEC has affirmatively impeded the effectiveness of the shareholder voting process both through its adoption of rules that interfere with shareholder democracy and through its failure to adopt rules to address deficiencies in the process"); Loewenstein, supra note 8, at 795-800 (arguing that if shareholders had meaningful access to the proxy, then they could use this power to ensure an independent board of directors, but that free rider and other coordination problems usually doom proposals not supported by management); Palmiter, supra note 4, at 880 (arguing, inter alia, that "Rule creasing shareholder access to the proxy, one author suggested that "[t]o the extent that shareholders are sufficiently concerned with ordinary business matters to draft a shareholder proposal in conformity with the [procedural requirements of the] proxy rules, a corporation should include such a proposal in the proxy materials."' 8 6 The SEC's view, however, has been much more tempered. While arguably increasing shareholder access to the proxy in various ways over the last few decades, overall, it appears that the SEC remains committed to the substantive and procedural burdens placed upon shareholders desiring to offer proposals. There are also many commentators who, for a variety of reasons, are opposed to giving shareholders increased access to the proxy.
8 7 In the area of executive compensation, very few would argue with the statement that shareholder access to the proxy was dramatically increased in 1992-and what was given to shareholders then has not been taken away since that time. Yet, there was still a decline in the overall number of executive pay proposals submitted from 1994 to 1996.188 One cannot argue that the effects of these changes are simply unrealized because enough time has not passed to see the fruits of these changes. As of 1994, shareholders had almost two full proxy seasons to adjust to the new disclosure rules and changes in SEC policy. Still, the fact remains that the numbers of proposals in the area of executive compensation remain at surprisingly low levels. 186 Goforth, supra note 3, at 459-60. This suggestion clearly goes too far and at first glance strikes me as analogous to the following: to the extent that I am willing to take the time and go through the trouble and expense of filling out 50 lottery tickets in the correct manner (making sure that all the circles are completely filled in), I should win the $1 million prize. The statement makes more logical sense when taken as a comment on the difficulty of complying with all of the SEC's complicated procedural rules. With results like this, it makes one wonder why the SEC continues to go through the trouble of studying shareholder preferences and tinkering with the federal proxy rules. 190 It also lends credence to a number of the arguments made in favor of restricting access to the proxy. 19 1 How long must the pattern of perceived shareholder apathy to this and other issues continue before the advocates of increasing shareholder access to the proxy-as a means of correcting compensation abuses-realize that their efforts are misplaced?
IV. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
A. The Status of Delaware Law
Shareholders have a right to bring their complaints about excessive compensation to court in the form of shareholder derivative suits. Lawsuits often allege one or more of the following: "that the board acted carelessly or was not fully informed; that the board had a conflict of interest ... ; that the proxy materials. .. were incomplete or misleading; and that the compensation awarded.., constitutes a waste of corporate assets." ' 192 The Supreme Court first authorized lower courts to hear shareholder challenges to excessive compensation earlier this century in Rogers v. Hill. 193 This case still has a place in the Delaware courts. 194 Delaware courts rely on Rogers for the principle that "compensation payments may grow so large that they are unconscionable." 195 Thus, even though courts today may hesitate to attack the substance of a compensation package, they do so in the face of a Supreme Court mandate that recognizes that there is still a point at which the pay level is too high, regardless of the process used to arrive at the package. I have chosen Delaware as the focus of this judicial inquiry because it is well recognized that Delaware has both the most highly developed corpo- 190 The obvious answer is that it gives the SEC something to do. See supra text accompanying note 123 (quoting the SEC Final Rule and illustrating how the SEC is essentially propagating its own existence in promulgating changes to the proxy rules).
19, The purpose of this Comment, however, is not to argue that the SEC should restrict access to the proxy in any way. Decisions since Rogers have produced a variety of unclear and poorly articulated tests that turn on whether a given compensation package was approved by a disinterested board with a majority of outside directors, ratified by a majority of disinterested shareholders, both, or neither. This makes summarizing the law in the area of executive compensation difficult at times because existing doctrines and analyses often lack rational analysis. For example, the exact relationship between the directors' duty of care and the business judgment rule has never been successfully explained in any generally acceptable fashion. Nor have the exact relationships between the duty of care, the business judgment rule and the doctrine of "corporate waste" been clarified.
197
This difficulty becomes apparent as soon as one tries to put together a cohesive analysis of judicial opinions in this area. A few things, however, are clear. First, Delaware law expressly authorizes the board of directors to determine executive compensation. 19 8 Second, the board of directors generally delegates the task of determining executive pay to a compensation committee. 199 Finally, the compensation decision, whether made by the board of directors or the compensation committee, is generally afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. 200 The Supreme Court of Delaware described the business judgment rule as a rebuttable presumption, and defined it as "a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 196 200 See id. at 803 ("As with all decisions by the board of directors and its committees, the protection of the business judgment rule nominally extends to executive compensation decisions as well.").
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. ' 2 0 1 The Delaware Supreme Court applied this rule in the early case of Beard v. Elster to preclude itself from substituting its own "uninformed opinion for that of experienced business managers. '20 2 Because the rule protects business decisions to such a degree as to render meaningless any scrutiny given to the decision, the rule recently has been used to effectively insulate business decisions from judicial review.
2°3
There are a number of instances when the business judgment rule is not used, or, from the plaintiff-shareholder's perspective, when a meaningless level of scrutiny can be evaded. When a director of a Delaware corporation is essentially on both sides of the bargaining table, thereby raising the specter of self-dealing, the test is different: in these cases, the director has the burden of proving the "entire fairness" of the transaction. 2 0 4 However, directors can often avoid the heightened scrutiny that comes with a fairness review simply by delegating the task of determining executive pay to a compensation committee comprised of independent directors.
Another means of avoiding the meaningless scrutiny provided under the business judgment rule is to allege facts sufficient to prove that the compensation is so excessive as to constitute waste. This was the argument made in Rogers, where the Supreme Court focused on the size of the compensation in determining that an investigation was warranted. 20 5 It is significant that the Rogers Court focused on the size of the compensation, rather than the process used to arrive at the compensation. Recently, however, the focus has shifted to an inquiry into the procedures used to authorize and ratify executive compensation packages. 20 6 This indicates a shift away from substantive judicial review of executive compensation packages. The concept of waste will be developed more fully in the next Subpart. 201 Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 202 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960). The Beard case concerns compensation and thus is directly relevant to the analysis that follows.
203See Bogus, supra note 12, at 64 (noting that "the business judgment rule erects insurmountable obstacles to realistic challenges of any board decision"). 204 See Weinberger v. U.O.P., Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (discussing the aspects of the entire fairness test and its two basic components, fair dealing and fair price); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 333 (Del. Ch. 1997) (observing that directors dealing with themselves "constitutes self-dealing that would ordinarily require that the directors prove that the grants involved were, in the circumstances, entirely fair to the corporation").
205 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933) (stating that the compensation was "so large as to warrant investigation in equity"). 206 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 337-38 (noting the focus on procedures).
Allen recognized the differences between shareholder ratification of an action by a director and the classic examples of ratification by a single principal.
21
' He also noted three factors that complicate the application of general ratification principles to shareholder ratification 16 and seemingly acknowledged that shareholder votes on issues like this should be accorded little weight.
Chancellor Allen then proceeded to an analysis of the history of Delaware law dealing with stock option plans that were ratified by shareholders. He found support for the proposition that informed shareholder ratification validates a grant unless there is waste (effect two above). 217 He found, however, that the waste standard articulated in earlier cases was "not a waste standard at all, but was a form of 'reasonableness' or proportionality review." 218 In the early cases, stock option grants (even those with shareholder ratification) had to satisfy a two-part test: (1) the company had to receive "sufficient consideration" 219 and (2) the plan had to assure that the consideration would pass to the company.
22
Chancellor Allen correctly read this weighing of reasonableness to be more heightened than the scrutiny ordinarily associated with a waste standard, and thus easier to satisfy.
221
Chancellor Allen concluded, however, that the tests employed by earlier which held that effective ratification triggers a waste standard (effect two); and Citron v. EL DuPont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 500-02 (Del. Ch. 1990), which held that effective ratification shifts the burden of proof of unfairness to the plaintiff (effect three)). 215 See Vogelstein, 699 A.2d at 335 (noting that these differences "lead to a difference in the effect of a valid ratification"). 216 See id. The first problem was that the "principal" in this transaction was an aggregate of individuals and thus ratification decisions were subject to traditional collective action problems. See id. Second, ratification was not occurring here in the traditional sense, to confer legal authority, but rather it was to affirm that an action taken was truly in the best interests of the shareholders. See id. Finally, ratifying a director conflict transaction was affected by related statutory law, Delaware General Corporation Law section 144. See id. 217 See, e.g., Michelson, 407 A.2d at 218-19 (explaining that acts that amount to a "waste of corporate assets" are not "susceptible to cure by shareholder approval"); Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) (stating that shareholder ratification of a stock option plan is not sufficient to cure the transaction if there is not "a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefits passing to the corporation and the value of the options granted"). Chancellor Allen might have misread the Michelson decision in another, more meaningful, way. He read Michelson as offering support for the proposition that informed shareholder ratification shifts the inquiry from one of fairness to one of waste (effect two above). 232 However, the Michelson court clearly held that "shareholder ratification shifted the burden of proof of want or inadequacy of consideration for the grant of the options from defendants to plaintiff., 233 The court also noted that ordinarily the burden would be on the self-interested directors to prove that there was a "fair exchange," but shareholder ratification shifts the burden of proving a lack of fair exchange to the plaintiff shareholder. 234 These are verbatim adoptions of the third effect of shareholder ratification stated above.
5
Thus, Chancellor Allen's reading has the effect of giving shareholder ratification more deference, while Michelson arguably militates for less.
Chancellor Allen's reading of Beard is also problematic. Allen stated that the court in Beard "relaxed slightly the general formulation" of the twoprong test for waste by rejecting the notion that the corporation needed assurance of consideration in order to validate a grant. 236 The Beard court, however, clearly adopted the intermediate level of scrutiny used by its predecessor courts in requiring the corporation to "reasonably expect to receive the contemplated benefit from the grant of options"; and also in rethe sufficiency thereof shall be conclusive"). Chancellor Allen interpreted the multiple references to "waste" made in quiring "a reasonable relationship between the value of the benefit passing to the corporation and the value of the options granted. '23 7 Therefore, although Beard arguably moved us toward a slightly stricter standard of waste, it clearly did not deviate from the "reasonableness" test employed by preceding courts.
There are a few other interesting points about Chancellor Allen's decision in Vogelstein. First, he clearly recognized that the "Supreme Court [of Delaware] has not expressly deviated from the 'proportionality' approach to waste of its earlier decision." 2 38 Also, Chancellor Allen clings to the belief that shareholder assent is a better way to monitor compensation abuse than judicial attempts at parsing through the fairness or the sufficiency of a given level of consideration 2 39 At bottom, he does not want to look at the compensation package itself and determine whether it is excessive; rather, he would prefer to focus on the independence of the process used to arrive at that compensation package. This departs from courts past and present, which have not found an analysis of the substance of a compensation package to be so problematic. 4 Finally, despite his feelings on the issue, Chancellor Allen still heeds the Michelson court's advice that the case law "indicate[s] a strong disfavor for summary judgment in stock option claims where waste of corporate assets is alleged." 2 4 1 Although arguing for a stricter waste standard that effectively would preclude substantive judicial review-stating that the judiciary is not the proper body to make these decisions and summarily dismissing those who think that it is--Chancellor Allen recognizes that inquiries into waste are "inherently factual and not easily amenable to determination on a motion to dismiss [or] ... a motion for summary judgment." 2 42 Thus, despite all the rhetoric, the plaintiff's action in Vogelstein survived a motion to dismiss.
The effect of such a strict definition of waste became clear in a few recent cases dealing with executive compensation packages that were challenged as waste. Zupnick v. Goizueta, 243 a shareholder suit attacking a stock option grant to Coca-Cola CEO Roberto Goizueta, was decided two months before Vogelstein. In Goizueta, the court restated the definition of waste set out in Michelson that is used in cases where there has been shareholder ratification: "[T]he complaint must support the conclusion that 'no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would say that the consideration received for the options was a fair exchange for the options granted.' ' ' 244 The court recognized the near impossibility of satisfying such an extreme test. 245 The court dismissed the case for failure to state a legally cognizable claim for waste before ever reaching the merits. An even more extreme result was reached in recent litigation involving The Walt Disney Company and the severance package given to fourteenmonth President Michael Ovitz.
2 47 Among other things, Disney's employment contract with Ovitz contained a no-fault provision, which provided that three million of Ovitz's stock options would vest immediately upon a departure based upon this provision.
24 Apparently, the value of this grant was never calculated for the board of directors prior to voting on the compensation package. 249 Of course, Ovitz departed from Disney a mere fourteen months after he was hired, amidst rumors of his inability to handle the job effectively. The plaintiff-shareholders sued Disney claiming, among other things, waste. By the court's admission, the severance package totaled $140 million.
Yet, the court proceeded to attempt to minimize not only the figure itself, but the type of decision that the board made: Does this reasoning make logical sense? Does it contradict the Supreme Court's decision in Rogers v. Hill?
The court in Walt Disney took a particularly stringent view of waste. The standard adopted holds directors liable only when they "'authorize an exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration."' 252 The court did not discuss the various waste standards put forth by previous courts, as Chancellor Allen did in Vogelstein, nor did the court acknowledge the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court still has not departed from the proportionality review of earlier jurisprudence. 253 Finally, and most critical to the decision, the Walt Disney court, like the Goizueta court, ignored the factual nature of the dispute and the warnings of Michelson and dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment. 
C. A Modest Proposal for Reform
In light of the removal of some of the clearest regulatory obstacles to shareholder activism in 1992, one would have expected to see an increase in activism in the last seven years. Particularly, one would expect to see a rise in proposals concerning executive compensation, which has been a prime target for criticism in recent years. Removing a few regulatory obstacles to shareholder activism in 1992, however, did not solve the problem of excessive executive compensation. Rather, shareholder proposals have not risen at all-they actually have remained relatively flat and at a low level.
2 55 In addition, executive compensation has not decreased, nor has it even remained at the same level from year to year.
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6 Regardless of enhanced disclosure and shareholders' increased ability to put forth proposals relating to executive compensation, pay levels continue to rise at unabated levels. The figures suggest that altering the federal proxy rules to give shareholders increased access to the proxy will not remedy the situation.
This Comment argues that compensation critics have missed the mark by attacking the SEC and the federal proxy rules. Shareholder proposals are, at best, an indirect way of correcting compensation abuses-they are still only advisory, and generally have very little success in winning a majority of the shareholders' votes. There are real impediments to shareholder action at the ballot box, impediments that should not be overlooked when searching for a remedy. 5 7 Further, there is clearly something about executive compensation proposals in particular that make them unappealing targets for shareholder proposals or support. Critics, then, must turn to other avenues to solve the problem of executive overcompensation. Despite the SEC's insistence that shareholders use the ballot box instead of resorting to the courts for relief, this Comment argues that shareholders should seek judicial relief. Further, due to the inherent conflicts present in the area of executive compensation, Delaware courts should lead the state courts in a general return to a heightened level of scrutiny when dealing with executive compensation transactions. The proposal that this Comment sets forth has two prongs. First, compensation packages that have not been ratified by a disinterested and independent compensation committee or by the shareholders of the company should warrant a broad judicial inquiry and be given strict scrutiny. This level of scrutiny makes sense when one recognizes that Delaware courts treat approvals from these committees as very important. The second prong of the proposal provides for the situation where there is disinterested approval of a compensation plan. In these situations, courts should analyze a pay package under a "reasonableness" review. Note that this proposal arguably does not reflect a dramatic change in Delaware law. 2 59 Despite the Chancery Court's recent resistance to substantive reviews of the executive compensation packages in Vogelstein, Goizueta, and Walt Disney, there is support in Delaware case law for a "reasonableness" review of challenged transactions. The courts should return to the two-pronged test articulated in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc.:260
The validity of a [compensation] plan... depends directly upon the existence of consideration to the corporation and the inclusion in the plan of conditions, or the existence of circumstances which may be expected to insure that the contemplated consideration will in fact pass to the corporation. Delaware courts can rely not only on the case law that supports this type of proportional review, but also on the large body of literature that continues to develop detailing the excessiveness of executive compensation and the inability of shareholder ratification procedures, disinterested boards, or compensation committees to deal with the problem.
262
Courts like the Vogelstein court can find answers to the elusive question "What is excessive?" by relying on objective principles (not subjective linedrawing), if they simply look for them. Further, valuation is not as problematic as Chancellor Allen would have us think. In most cases, an explicit valuation of the pay package would not be necessary, because the posture of a case would generally be one where the compensation plan had been adopted, but not yet implemented. In cases where the compensation had already been paid, a number of useful factors could be considered, "the most frequently mentioned being compensation of similar executives in other companies in the same industry, the success of the company as determined by various financial measures, the ability and performance of the executive, and the absolute size of the payments."
263 Regardless of the method chosen for valuation or the factors considered, this type of valuation intuitively strikes one as easier than, for instance, valuing a firm for appraisal purposes, which courts often unhesitatingly do. 264 As one academic accurately noted, "if it is not possible to state objectively how much a particular individual should be paid, it is often possible to declare that an individual has been paid too much. 
